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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
by
Ernest E. Figari, Jr.*
THE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the survey
period are found in judicial decisions. This Survey will examine these
developments and consider their impact on existing Texas procedure.
I.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

The reach of the Texas long-arm statute, article 2031b, 1 continues to be
2
the subject of judicial measurement. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau,
a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
is both a procedural and substantive yardstick. Noting the conflict between
the state and federal rule on the placement of the burden of proof in a jurisdictional contest,8 the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that "the party seeking to
invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court has the burden of establishing that
jurisdiction exists, and the burden may not be shifted to the party challenging the jurisdiction."' 4 In detailing the requirements of the burden, the Fifth
Circuit observed that a plaintiff need only make "a prima facie showing of
the facts on which jurisdiction was predicated, not a prima facie demonstra5
tion of the existence of a cause of action."
Cousteau is also instructive for its treatment of vicarious jurisdiction. The
plaintiff had entered into a contract with one of the nonresident defendants
which was partially performable in Texas. Since articlc 2031b authorizes the
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident when he is "doing business" in
Texas," and "doing business" is defined to include "entering into contract by
mail or otherwise

.

. .

to be performed in whole or in part by either party

in this State,"' 7 personal jurisdiction was sustained over the contracting defendant.8 From this position the plaintiff theorized that the contracting defendant was acting as the agent of the other defendants, and therefore such
defendants were also parties to the contract and doing business in Texas. 9
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern
Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
2. 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).

3. Id. at 489-90. Compare Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.

-Austin
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Taylor v. American Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d
26 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1972, no writ); and Roquemore v. Roquemore, 431
S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ); with Jetco Electronic

Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); Benjamin v. Western Boat Bldg.
Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830 (1973); and Tetco Metal

Prods.,
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Inc. v. Langham, 387 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1968).
495 F.2d at 490.
Id. at 491.
TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 3 (1964).
Id. § 4.
495 F.2d at 492.

9. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit recognized that under this theory a showing of either actual or apparent authority is essential and emphasized that "I[b]oth types of
authority depend for their creation on some manifestations, written or spoken
words or conduct, by the principal, communicated either to the agent (actual
authority) or to the third party (apparent authority). '"1O Concluding that
neither hearsay nor statements by the alleged agent met the required showing,1 1 the court upheld the dismissal of all defendants, except the contracting
2
defendant, from the suit for want of personal jurisdiction.'
14
Not to be outreached," a a federal district court in Reul v. Sahara Hotel
concluded that the Texas activities of a parent corporation should be imputed
to its subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes, thereby allowing the court to sustain nonresident service on the subsidiary. The plaintiffs brought suit against
several corporate defendants, one of which was a subsidiary of another, seeking recovery for personal injuries sustained. The parent corporation was
served with process through its registered agent in Texas, but service on the
subsidiary, which was neither incorporated in Texas nor licensed to do business in the State, was effected under article 2031 b. The subsidiary filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Although the parent corporation owned all of the common stock of the subsidiary, maintained common directors with the subsidiary, and controlled the business decisions of
the subsidiary, the evidence reflected that the two corporations had preserved
their corporate identities. Nevertheless, emphasizing that the companies
were family-owned, used the same trade name, and performed essentially the
same business, the federal district court imputed the activities of the parent
corporation to its subsidiary, stating that "there is present here more than that
amount of control of one corporation over another which mere common ownership and directorship would indicate."' 15 Consequently, service on the subsidiary under article 2031b was sustained.
Unler article 2039a 6 a nonresident who makes use of streets and highways
within the state by the operation of a motor vehicle is subject to jurisdiction
through service upon the chairman of the State Highway Commission. Service under this article may only be utilized on a claim arising out of an accident or collision resulting from use of the state's streets and highways. Adhering to the rule that a plaintiff must allege facts showing that he is entitled
to resort to substituted service under a particular statute,' 7 the court of civil
10. ld. at 493.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 494.
13. Straining the long-arm of article 2031b, a federal district court had concluded
during a previous survey period that the Texas activities of a subsidiary corporation
should be imputed to its parent for jurisdictional purposes so as to sustain nonresident
service on the parent. Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.
Tex. 1971). But see Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D.
Tex. 1973).
14. 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
15. Id. at 998.
16. TEx. Rrv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (1964).
17. See, e.g., McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965); Flynt v. City of
Kingsville, 125 Tex. 510, 82 S.W.2d 934 (1935).
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appeals in Gianelle v. Morgan'8 invalidated service under article 2039a because the plaintiffs had failed to allege the defendant was a nonresident.
II.

VENUE

Significant developments in venue practice during the survey period were
concentrated in the area of ancillary claims. Section 2(g) of the Texas comparative negligence statute, 19 which provides that "[a]ll claims for contribution between named defendants in the primary suit shall be determined in
the primary suit," was construed for the first time in Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Edwards.20 Concluding that section 2(g) is a mandatory venue provision, the court held that where a crossclaim for contribution is asserted between defendants, the crossclaim is to be tried in the county where the court
21
hearing the main suit is situated.
Coquina Oil Corp. v. Sojourner Drilling Corp.22 also provides guidance in
determining the venue of an ancillary claim. 'In considering a plea of privilege asserted to a third party action, .the court held that the third party action
must be viewed as separate and distinct from the main suit for venue purposes. 2' According to Estes Chemical Co. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,24 however, if
the plaintiff makes :the third party defendant a defendant in the main suit
after he is brought into the action, the third party action should be tried in the
same county as the main suit. As regards a counterclaim, Robinson v. National Bank of Commerce' 5 reiterates the rule that the venue of a counterclaim is the same as that of the main suit provided the counterclaim arises
out of, or is incidental to, the subject matter of the main suit.
Under subdivision 3 of article 1995,26 if the residence of a defendant is
unknown, suit may be brought in the county in which the plaintiff resides.
27
In order to invoke subdivision 3, however, the court in Meurer v. Wheeler
reasoned that a plaintiff must have exercised "reasonable diligence" to ascer28
tain the defendant's residence prior to filing suit.
Article 1995, subdivision 429 provides that a suit against two or more defendants may be brought in any county where one of the defendants resides.
In order to establish the application of subdivision 4, it is well established
that a plaintiff must prove that at least one defendant resides in the county
18. 514 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
19. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Supp. 1974).
20. 512 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
21. Id. at 753.
22. 515 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ).
23. Id. at 173; accord, Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d 774
(1944); High Plains Natural Gas Co. v. City of Perryton, 434 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1968, no writ). Contra, Gillette Motor Transp. Co. v. Whitfield, 160
S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942, no writ). See generally 1 R. McDoNALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACrIcF § 4.39 (1965).

24. 501 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), jdgmt set aside and cause
remanded per stipulation,505 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1974).
25. 515 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
26. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 3 (1964).
27. 509 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd).
28. Id. at 647.
29. TEX. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 4 (1964).
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of suit, the plaintiff has a bona fide cause of action against the resident defendant, and the remaining defendants are proper parties to the claim
asserted against the resident defendant.3 0 Adding to an existing conflict in
the decisions of the courts of civil appeals, 3 ' the court in Houston Sash &
Door Co. v. Davidson3 2 concluded that a plaintiff must prove that the cause
of action against the resident defendant exists at the time of the venue hearing, rather than at the time of the filing of the plea of privilege.
Article 1995, subdivision 538 provides for an exception to exclusive venue
in a defendant's county of residence where the defendant has contracted in
writing to perform an obligation in the county of suit. 'In a case of first impression, the Beaumont court of civil appeals held that venue could not be
maintained under subdivision 5 where the defendant orally assumed a written
4
contract.8
The constitutionality of article 1995, subdivision 27,8 5 which authorizes a
wider range of venue for actions against a foreign corporation than is afforded
against a domestic corporation under subdivision 23,36 had been in doubt for
many years. 8 7 In 1963, however, the Texas Supreme Court approved the
disparate venue treatment of foreign corporations38 and the constitutionality
of subdivision 27 was thought to have been decided.3 9 Indicating that such
a conclusion may have been premature, the United States Supreme Court
recently noted probable jurisdiction of the question and directed that the
matter be presented on its merits. 40 Unfortunately, the appellee withdrew
his opposition to the change of venue and the case was remanded to the court
of civil appeals to consider whether the venue question was moot. 41 While
it is now unlikely that the question will be presented to the Supreme Court
30. See, e.g., Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633, 95 S.W.2d 1300
(1936).
31. Compare Harris v. Allison, 29 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1930,
no writ), and Logan v. Ludwick, 283 S.W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1926, no

writ), with A & M Constr. Co. v. Davidson, 485 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1972, no writ).
32. 509 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (2-1 decision).
33. Ch. 213, § 1, [1935] Tex. Laws 503, as amended by ch. 213, § 1, [1973] Tex.
Laws 489, presently TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 5(a) (Supp. 1974).
34. Hurst v. Rush, 514 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ).

35. TEx. REV. Civ.

STAT. ANN.

art. 1995, subd. 27 (1964).

36. Id. subd. 23.
37. Compare Commercial Ins. Co. v. Adams, 366 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [lst Dist.]), af'd per curiam, 369 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1963), with Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Torrez, 359 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), writ dism'd w.o.j., 363
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1962); and Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 327 S.W.2d 358

(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1959, no writ). See generally Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders,
274 U.S.490 (1927).

38. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Adams, 369 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1963) (per curiam).
39.

See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Falknor, 492 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-

ton [lst Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Preston, 487 S.W.2d
956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ dism'd); National Life & Accident Ins. Co.
v. Notter, 455 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, writ dism'd); Great American
Ins. Co. v. Sharpstown State Bank, 422 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ
dism'd).

40. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Preston, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973), noting prob. juris.
of 487 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ dism'd).

41. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Preston, 415 U.S. 904 (1974).
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in that case, 42 a later decision 43 dealing with the same point appears to be
headed in that direction.
The rule has long prevailed in Texas that if a plaintiff takes a nonsuit of
an action while a defendant's plea of privilege is pending the effect of the
dismissal is an implied admission that the defendant's plea is good and venue
of the subject matter is established to be in the county of the defendant's
residence. 44 Curiously, during the survey period two exceptions to the rule
have evolved. In Wood v. Wood 45 the court concluded that the rule was
inapplicable where the defendant had moved his residence subsequent to the
dismissal and was no longer a resident of the county to which his plea was
directed in the earlier case. The court created a second exception to the rule
in Hawkins v. Hawkins46 where the defendant, subsequent to the dismissal
of the first action, commenced a suit involving the same subject matter and
the plaintiff counterclaimed. In this situation the court determined that the
defendant waived his right to be sued in the county of his residence on any
counterclaim arising out of the subject matter asserted by the plaintiff in the
second action.
Rule 86, 47 which prescribes the requirements of a controverting plea, provides that such a plea shall set out specifically "the grounds" relied upon to
maintain venue in the county of suit. Illustrating the liberality of this plead48
ing requirement is the situation considered in Mobile Oil Corp. v. Gibbons.
The plaintiffs, who had brought suit to recover damages resulting from oil
spillage onto their property, responded to the defendants' pleas of privilege
with the filing of a controverting plea which adopted the factual allegations
of their petition and averred that such allegations constituted a trespass within
the meaning of Article 1995, subdivision 9. 49 While the allegations of the
controverting plea also stated a cause of action for damage to land under subdivision 14 of the venue statute,50 that provision was not specifically
mentioned. Concluding that the factual allegations were controlling, the
court of civil appeals held that the pleadings and evidence supported venue
in the county of suit as to both defendants under subdivision 14, although
the requirements of subdivision 9 were not met.51 This result was obtained
despite a request by the plaintiffs immediately prior to the venue hearing to
amend their controverting plea to include reference to subdivision 14. The
request was withdrawn when the defendants sought a postponement of the
hearing to prepare further in the event the amendment was allowed.
42. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Preston, 515 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ dism'd).
43. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 515 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1974, writ dism'd).
44. E.g., Tempelmeyer v. Blackburn, 141 Tex. 600, 175 S.W.2d 222 (1943); Royal
Petroleum Corp. v. McCallum, 134 Tex. 543, 135 S.W.2d 958 (1940).
45. 504 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
46. 515 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ dism'd).
47. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86.

48.
49.
50.
51.

511 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 9 (1964).
Id. subd. 14.
511 S.W.2d at 603.
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LIMITATIONS

Franco v. Allstate Insurance Co.,5 2 a case of first impression in Texas,
should be of particular interest to plaintiffs' counsel. In considering this suit
brought under an uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy to recover for personal injuries to one of the plaintiffs and for the wrongful death
of the plaintiffs' daughter, the Texas Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether the two- 53 or four-year5 4 statute of limitations was applicable.
Finding the four-year statute to be applicable to both claims, the court held
that "although ultimate recovery in this type of action depends upon proof
of damages due to the tort of an uninsured third party, the cause of action
against the insurer arises by reason of the written contract." 55
Making an Erie' 6-educated forecast of Texas law, a federal district court
in Thrift v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc.57 extended the "discovery of the cause
of action rule" beyond the professional malpractice area," to the running of
the statute of limitations in a breach of warranty action against a drug manufacturer. Observing that the effects of a slow developing drug injected into
a patient would be difficult to detect prior to their manifestation, the court
concluded that the applicable statute of limitations commences to run on the
date of discovery of the injury or on the date discovery should reasonably
have been made. 59
Section 2.725 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code60 provides that
"[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued." Two decisions during the
survey period, Wilson v. Browning Arms Co.61 and Big D Service Co. v. Climatrol Industries, Inc., 62 joining with an earlier case, 63 have authoritatively
ruled that section 2.725 extends to four years the statute of limitations applicable to an open account or oral contract for the sale'of goods and materials.
IV.

PARTIES

Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries, Inc.,64 the most significant decision dur52. 505 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1974).
53. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958).

54. Id. art. 5527.
55. 505 S.W.2d at 791-92.
56. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

57. 381 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
58. See Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972) (unsuccessful vasectomy by phy-

sician); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967) (foreign object left in body by

surgeon); Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967) (negligent preparation of
tax return by accountant); see Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 11
HOUSTON L. REV. 825, 839 (1974); 46 TEXAS L. REV. 119 (1967). See generally Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627 (1973).
59. 381 F. Supp. at 546.
60. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (1968).

61. 501 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd) (suit

on a sworn account).

62. 514 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ refd) (suit on a sworn
account).
63. Ideal Builders Hardware Co. v. Cross Constr. Co., 491 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ); see Spies, Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2--Sales; Performance and Remedies, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 629, 638-39 (1966); Teofan,
Commercial Transactions,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 88, 93 (1969).
64. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974), noted in 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1410 (1974).
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ing the past year dealing with joinder of parties, dealt with both the doctrine
of virtual representation and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39.65 After the
husband's action to rescind a purchase of realty by the community estate had
been dismissed with prejudice, the husband and wife brought a second suit
to rescind the purchase. Concluding that the judgment in the first action was
res judicata as to the second, the trial court dismissed the later action. In
an appeal from the dismissal, the husband and wife contended that the first
judgment did not constitute a bar because the wife, who was a named grantee
together with her husband, was an indispensable party to the first suit. Previously, under the doctrine of virtual representation, a judgment affecting
community property in a suit involving only the husband as a party was also
binding on the wife, since the management of community property was vested
solely in the husband. 66 Since the effective date of section 5.2267 of the
Texas Family Code, however, the management of community property such
as that considered in Cooper is vested jointly in the husband and wife. Concluding that the doctrine of virtual representation in this area was abolished
by the new Family Code, the Texas Supreme Court held that the wife was
not bound by the judgment in the first action, though her husband was.68
Cooper went on to consider the question of whether the wife was an indispensable party to the first action. Under the traditional view, if the wife
was an indispensable party, the judgment in the first action would have been
void and not res judicata as to the husband.6 9 Emphasizing that the enactment of present rule 39 was aimed at avoiding questions of jurisdiction, the
court stated that under "present Rule 39 it would be rare indeed if there
were a person whose presence was so indispensable in the sense that his absence deprives the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate between the parties already joined."'70 Finding that rule 39 permitted the resolution of the issues
in the first action without the joinder of the wife, the court held that the judgment in such action was valid and res judicata as to the husband.
However, specific statutory language providing for joinder of parties has
been held to prevail over the liberal joinder procedure of rule 39. In Crickmer v. King7l the court admonished that all persons whose interests are affected by the outcome of a declaratory action seeking the construction of a
will must be joined as parties to the suit. In a suit brought by an executor
to obtain a construction of a provision in a will, the children and grandchildren of the testator were listed as devisees and legatees under the provision,
but were not joined as parties. Concluding that the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act, 72 which states that all parties whose interests will be affected by
65. TEx. R. Civ. P. 39.
66. E.g., Starr v. Schoellkopf Co., 131 Tex. 263, 113 S.W.2d 1227 (1938); Gabb
v. Boston, 109 Tex. 26, 193 S.W. 137 (1917).
67. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975) (effective Jan. 1, 1974).
68. 513 S.W.2d at 202; accord, Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974); see
City of Dumas v. Sheehan, 514 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no
writ).
69. See, e.g., Petroleum Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1966).
70. 513 S.W.2d at 204; accord, Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974).
71. 507 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
72. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, § 11 (1965).
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the declaration "shall be made parties" to the action, prevailed over the liberal joinder provisions of rule 39, 73 the court held that the omitted devisees
and legatees were indispensable parties to the action, and the trial court was
74
without jurisdiction to proceed in their absence.
7
Ford v. Bimbo Corp. 5 is a warning that the requirement of "adequate representation" in class actions brought under rule 4276 is not to be taken lightly.
Affirming the dismissal of a shareholders' derivative class action, where the
class representative was attempting in a pending federal action to rescind the
sale by which he purchased his shares of stock, the court held that "a party
cannot be a proper representative in a derivative suit so as to insure fairly
the adequate representation of the class of other shareholders when he simul77
taneously seeks in another suit to remove himself from that class."1
V.

DISCOVERY

Providing an almost immediate interpretation of recently amended rule
167,78 which authorizes the discovery of the report of an expert "who will
be called as a witness," is Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Cunningham.79 In
a suit charging it with the negligent design of pavement, causing a paving
failure, the defendant filed a motion for production of tangible items under
rule 167, focusing on the discovery of certain photographs and experts' reports pertaining to the failure. The plaintiff objected to production on the
basis of the work product doctrine, and responded with a sworn answer
stating that the individuals who took the photographs and prepared the reports were employed after the paving failure, would not be called as witnesses
by it, and were being used solely for consultation. After an in camera inspection of the items, however, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to produce
specified photographs and reports of experts. In the ensuing mandamus proceeding, the Texas Supreme Court had occasion to interpret rule 167.
First, regarding the reports of the experts who the plaintiff stated would
not be called as witnesses, the court concluded that rule 167 clearly did not
permit their discovery.8 0 With respect to another firm of experts, however,
the plaintiff had stated that while it would not utilize them as witnesses in
chief, it might do so for rebuttal or impeachment purposes. Finding the report of these experts to be discoverable, the court observed that one purpose
of rule 167 was "to protect a party utilizing the assistance of experts from
discovery of their reports only when they will not be used as a witness, wheth81
in chief or otherwise.)
The court also considered the discoverability of two sets of photographs
which the plaintiff had been ordered to produce. The court noted that rule
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Civ. P. 39.
507 S.W.2d at 317.
512 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
TEx. R. Crv. P. 42.
512 S.W.2d at 796.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
502 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973), noted in 28 Sw. L.J. 617 (1974).
502 S.W.2d at 548.
Id.
TEx. R.
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167 expressly authorized the discovery of photographs, and that the only exception would be under the work product doctrine provided the photographs
qualified as "written communications" between the representatives or employees of a party made subsequent to the transaction on which the suit is
based.8 2 Construing the phrase strictly, the court held that the first set of
photographs, which were not an integral part of any report, were not "written communications" within the intendments of rule 167 and were therefore
subject to discovery.8 3 The remaining set of photographs accompanied the
report of the experts who the plaintiff had stated might testify on rebuttal.
Ordering the production of these items, the court held that "photographs that
are a constituent of a bona fide report in writing of an expert take on the
discovery character of the written report and are governed by the provisions
'8 4
of Rule 167 applicable thereto.
Detailing the permissible scope of discovery in eminent domain proceedings is Ex parte Shepperd,85 a case of major importance. The question presented was whether a landowner may obtain, in advance of trial, appraisal
reports prepared by the government's intended appraisal witnesses pertaining
to land which is not the subject of the condemnation proceeding in which
the discovery is being sought. To the delight of all condemnees, the Texas
Supreme Court held that under rule 1678 6 "the reports sought are discoverable except to the extent they would be immune from discovery by the
owners of the tracts which they directly concern in pending condemnation
87
proceedings against those tracts."
Article 4411,88 which prohibits the attorney general from making in any
action an "admission, agreement or waiver" that prejudices the state, had
been interpreted by one court of civil appeals as exempting the state from
answering interrogatories. 8 9 This favored discovery treatment of the state
was brought to an end in Texas Department of Corrections v. HerringA0

Observing that "Rule 168 operates only -to clarify facts," the Texas Supreme
82. TEx. R. Cv. P. 167.
83. 502 S.W.2d at 549.
84. Id. at 550.
85. 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974).
86. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
87. 513 S.W.2d at 814. In setting forth the precise limits of its ruling, the supreme
court stated:
[W]e hold that appraisal reports concerning property comparable to that
involved in the present suits and prepared for the condemning authority
by appraisers who will appear as witnesses in the present suit are discoverable, except that: (1) any reports concerning land which is -the subject of
condemnation proceedings now pending in court at the trial or appellate
level are not discoverable unless the appraiser has been or will be called as
a witness in those proceedings also, and (2) any reports concerning land
which is the subject of pending condemnation proceedings or negotiations,
but in which no commissioners' award or appeal therefrom has yet been
filed are not discoverable.
Id. 817.
88. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.ANN.art. 4411 (1966).
89. Harrington v. State, 385 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 944 (1967). In arriving at this result, the court of civil apppeals had reasoned that "[it would be futile
for the Attorney General to answer interrogatories for the State when his answers could
not prejudice the rights of the State." 385 S.W.2d at 417.
90. 513 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. 1974).
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Court reasoned that it "does not believe that the State will be in any way
prejudiced by a full revelation of the facts involved in a case."' 1 However,
-the court limited the scope of interrogatories to the state by concluding that
in answering interrogatories the attorney general will not be called upon to
make an admission, agreement, or waiver.
The judicial treatment of trade secrets in the context of discovery was the
subject of Automatic Drilling Machines, Inc. v. Miller.92 In a suit between
active competitors in the automatic drilling rig field, the defendants, through
the use of a subpoena duces tecum, sought to depose and obtain various documents from a third-party witness who served as a consulting engineer to the
plaintiff. Prior to the deposition, however, plaintiff's counsel went through
the file produced by the witness and withdrew material relating to new systems for automatic drilling which were confidential and had been designed
for the plaintiff subsequent to the filing of the suit. When a request for disclosure of the information was refused during the deposition, counsel for defendants adjourned the session and immediately requested the trial court to
hear a motion to require the witness to comply with the subpoena and to
direct plaintiff's counsel not to interfere with the discovery process. Upon
being notified of the hearing set for that afternoon, plaintiff's counsel prepared and filed a motion for protective order pursuant to rule 186b, 98 requesting that the secret designs not be disclosed. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court, without examining the material in question, sustained
the defendants' motion to compel production and overruled the plaintiff's motion for protective order. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court concluded
that while trade secrets are not immune from discovery, it was incumbent
on the trial judge "to weigh the need for discovery against the desirability
of preserving the secrecy of the material in question. ' 94 In making this determination, the court directed that the trial judge should "examine the several documents and, with such expert assistance as may be required, determine the relevance and need for discovery of each and the extent to which
disclosure should be made" and "enter an order based on the determination
thus made." 95
Miller is also significant for its holding that "Rule 186b, unlike Rule 177a,
does not require that every motion for a protective order be filed at or before
the time of taking the deposition." 96 Rule 177a, which provides for the protection of witnesses subpoenaed to testify in court, requires that a motion for
a protective order be made "at or before the time specified in the subpoena
for compliance therewith. 9' 7 Rule 186b, on the other hand, stipulates that
a motion for a protective order in connection with a deposition need only
be "seasonably made."9 8
91. Id.at 8.

92. 515 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. 1974).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

TEX. R. Ov. P. 186b.
515 S.W.2d at 259.
Id. at 260.
Id.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 177a.
Tx. R. Civ. P. 186b.
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Rule 186a authorizes the discovery of the "identity and location of persons
. . . having knowledge of relevant facts." 99 While rule 186a permits the discovery of fact witnesses, reasoned the court in Employers Mutual Liability
Insurance Co. v. Butler,10 0 it cannot be used to compel a party to reveal
the witnesses he expects to call at the trial.
Rule 169, which governs the use of requests for admissions of fact, provides
that each of the matters of which an admission is sought shall be deemed
admitted unless, "within a period designated in the request, not less than ten
days after delivery thereof," the party to whom the request is directed serves
a sworn answer. 1 1 In considering a request for admissions of fact which demanded a response " 'within 10 days,' the court in Bynum v. Shatto10 2 held
that the request was defective since it contravened the minimum time limit
prescribed by rule 169. Thus, reasoned the court, the putative request could
not constitute a basis for deeming a fact admitted even though the response
was not served until fourteen days after the delivery of the request.
Stewart v. Vaughn 0 3 illustrates the risks attendant to shirking a request
for admissions of fact. Noting that the party to whom the request is directed
must make a good faith effort to ascertain the facts inquired about, the court
cautions that "[i]f responses to requests for admissions are wholly evasive
04
the trial court may deem them admitted."'
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Ratterree0 5 is authority for the proposition that a telephone acknowledgment of answers to interrogatories will not
be permitted. Since article 5949106 restricts a notary public's authority to
perform his duties to the county to which he is appointed, sworn answers to
interrogatories taken over the telephone from a party located in Kentucky
were held to be invalid.

VI.

DISMISSAL

Rule 164107 contemplates that a voluntary dismissal of a party from a suit
will be evidenced by an order of the trial court.' 08 The Beaumont court of
civil appeals recently concluded, however, that a party was just as effectively
dismissed from a suit by the omission of the party's name from the amended
pleadings as if a formal order of dismissal had been entered. 0 9
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a; see TEX. R. CIrv. P. 167, 168.
511 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
TEX. R. Civ. P.-169.
514 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
504 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
Id. at 602.

105. 512 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5949 (Supp. 1974).
107. TEx. R. Civ. P. 164.
108. See 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 23, § 17.14.
109. Barnett v. Maida, 503 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); accord, King v. Air Express Int'l Agency, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1967, no writ); Brennan v. Greene, 154 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1941, writ ref'd).

276

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VII.

[Vol. 29

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The rule is well established that the mere pleading of an affirmative defense will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. 110
Rather, a defendant is required to go beyond the allegations of his affirmative
defense and offer summary judgment proof that raises a fact issue as to that
defense."' Specifying the extent of this burden, the court in Kain v.
Neuhaus' 12 held that "[i]f such affirmative defense has more than one element, then a fact issue must be raised on each element necessary to such
3
defense.""1
Carlile v. Easterling'1 4 is an indication that a summary judgment cannot
be granted for default. The grant of a motion for summary judgment must
be based on the merits of the summary judgment proof, reasoned the court,
not on the failure of the movant's opponent to appear at the hearing on such
motion.
Article 2226,1 which authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees in specified cases, was amended in 1971 to provide that "[t]he amount prescribed
in the current State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule shall be prima facie evidence
of reasonable attorney's fees," and that "It]he court, in nonjury cases, may
take judicial knowledge of such schedule and of the contents of the case file
in determining the amount of attorney's fees without the necessity of hearing
further evidence." Prior to this amendment, it was well settled that the reasonableness of an attorney's fee-an issue of fact---could only be established
by opinion evidence, and that opinion adduced by affidavit on a motion for
summary judgment was insufficient to establish such fact as a matter of
law. 1 6 Adding to an existing conflict in the decisions of the courts of civil
appeals, 1 7 the court in Coward v. Gateway National Bank 1 8 concluded that
the prima facie effect of the fee schedule was, in the absence of opposing
evidence, sufficient to entitle a party to a summary judgment as to a reasonable attorney's fee.
VIII.

SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION

The opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell" 9
110. See, e.g., Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1974) (statute of limitations)

"Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1972) (promissory estoppel); Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. McBride, 159 Tex. 442, 322 S.W.2d 492 (1958)
(laches and estoppel).

111. See cases cited note 110 supra.
112.

515 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).

113. Id. at 50.
114. 502 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973, no writ).
115. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 2226 (Supp. 1974).

116. See, e.g., Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970); Lancaster v. Wynnewood State Bank, 470 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ).
But see Bagby Land & Cattle Co. v. California Livestock Comm'n Co., 439 F.2d 315,
318 (Sth Cir. 1971).
117. Compare Duncan v. Butterowe, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ), with McDonald v. Newlywed's, Inc., 483 S.W.2d 334
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Superior Stationers Corp. v.
Bero Corp., 483 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1972, no writ).

118. 515 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ granted).
119. 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974).
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is a guidebook to the submission of a res ipsa loquitur case to a jury. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable when (1) the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence
and (2) the instrumentality causing the injury is shown to have been under
the control of the defendant. 120 Disapproving submission of the "type of ac121
cident" and "control" factors to the jury as suggested by the lower court,
the supreme court observed that "[iln Texas it is well settled that res ipsa
loquitur is simply a rule of evidence whereby negligence may be inferred
upon proof of the factors stated."'12 2 While "[t]here may be justification for
submitting one or both of these sub-issues in a particular case in order to
focus the jury's attention on the matter," continued the court, "the better
practice in the great majority of cases is to submit only the ultimate negli1 23
gence issue.'
As regards accompanying instructions, the supreme court stated that:
In some cases the inferences arising from the circumstances of the accident are so apparent that no special instruction is necessary. In other
cases it is sufficient to give the jury a circumstantial evidence instruction to instruct them that acts of negligence can be proved both by
direct evidence and by inferences from other facts proved. Finally,
there are some cases in which it is helpful to give the jury a more specialized res ipsa instruction to the effect that if they find the two required
factors, they are24 entitled, but not compelled, to infer that the defendant
was negligent.'
Contrary to the view that "unavoidable accident" is to be treated as a routine submission, the court in McLeroy v. Stocker1 25 warns that an instruction
on unavoidable accident should not be given to the jury unless the evidence
is sufficient to warrant it. Moreover, in condemning the submission of the
120. E.g., Owen v. Brown, 447 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. 1969); Bond v. Otis Elevator Co.,
388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1965).
121. When the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is raised, the court of civil appeals has
concluded that the jury should be asked if it finds from a preponderance of the evidence
that:
1. The character and circumstance of the accident is such as to lend
reasonably to the belief that, without negligence, it would not have occurred.
2. The thing that caused the injury is shown to have been under the
management and control of the defendant.
3. It is more reasonably probable that the accident was caused by
defendant's negligence than not.
Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 502 S.W.2d 564, 567-68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973),
afI'd and remanded, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974).
122. 517 S.W.2d at 251.
123. Id. at 252. See generally Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special
Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973); 52 TxAs L. REv. 376 (1974).
124. 517 S.W.2d at 256. In the latter set of cases, the supreme court stated that the
following explanation could be given:

You are instructed that you may infer negligence by a party but are not
compelled to do so, if you find that the character of the accident is such
that it would ordinarily not happen in the absence of negligence and if you
find that the instrumentality causing the accident was under the manage-

ment and control of the party at the time the negligence, if any, causing
the accident probably occurred.

Id. at 257.
125. 505 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, no writ).
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unavoidable accident issue employed by the trial court, 126 the court noted that
a proper submission of the defense could be found in an earlier supreme court
decision on the subject. 127
Recently amended rule 277,128 which stipulates that "[i]nferential rebuttal
issues shall not be submitted," was given full effect in Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Mitchusson.1 29 Observing that the insurer's sole cause submission was an inferential rebuttal issue, the court concluded that it was properly refused by the trial court.
Meadows v. Bierschwale'80 points out the risk in omitting from the motion
for a new trial a valid objection to the jury charge. When the case was submitted to the jury an instruction defining the term "plaintiff" to include both
the plaintiff and the intervenor was included in the charge. As a result, the
jury's fraud findings were postured to favor the intervenor as well as the
plaintiff even though the intervenor was not, as a matter of law, entitled to
rely on the underlying representations. Conceding that the definition was
improper, the supreme court nevertheless held that the defendant had failed
to preserve the error by not including it in his motion for new trial as required by rule 374.181
Reflecting on the utility of rule 277182 are Blevins v. Baker133 and
Southern Steel Co. v. Manning.134 In Blevins the number of questions submitted to the jury was reduced from eighty-four to five on the basis that rule
277 requires only "controlling issues" be submitted. Similarly, objections to
special issues on the grounds that they were "global" and "general" were disregarded in Southern Steel Co., primarily because the rule encourages the
trial court to make broad submissions.
IX.

JURY PRACTICE

Although rule 233135 provides that "[e]ach party to a civil suit shall be
entitled to six peremptory challenges in a case tried in the district court
.... ." the fact that a person is named as a party to a suit does not
in itself entitle him to six peremptory challenges.' 8 6 In order for each of
two defendants to be entitled to six peremptory challenges, the interest of
those defendants must be antagonistic on an issue with which the jury is concerned. 13 7 Article 2151a, 13 8 interacting with rule 233, states that "[a]fter
proper alignment of parties, it shall be the duty of the court to equalize the
126. Id. at 618, 619.
127. See Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971).
128. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.

129. 515 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ).
130. 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974).
131. TEx. R. Civ. P. 374.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.

133. 511 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
134. 513 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).
135. TEX. R. CIrv. P. 233.
136. See, e.g., Retail Credit Co. v. Hyman, 316 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-

ton 1958, writ ref'd).
137. Shell Chem, Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1973).
138. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2151a (Supp. 1974). See generally Jones, Peremptory Challenges--Should Rule 233 Be Changed?, 45

TEXAs

L. REV. 80 (1966).
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number of peremptory challenges provided under Rule 233 . . . in accordance with the ends of justice so that no party is given an unequal advantage
" Concluding that article 2151a had altered the basic rule -that a trial
S..
court must determine from the pleadings whether two defendants are antagonistic, 139 the Texas Supreme Court recently held that "[t]he alignment of
parties is to be made not only on the basis of the pleadings but from a determination of the interests of the parties by information disclosed from pretrial procedures and which has been specifically called to the attention of the
0

court."14

In Jones v. Square Deal Cab Co.1 4 1 the court was faced with the contention that a jury verdict was not unanimous even though the foreman had
signed and returned it as such. Rule 292142 provides that a verdict may be
rendered in the district court by ten members of the original jury of twelve,
but a verdict so rendered must be signed by each of the ten concurring jurors.
Furthermore, rule 292 permits a verdict by less than a unanimous jury only
when the same jurors concur in the answer to all the issues. At a hearing
on a motion for new trial in Jones, two of the jurors testified that the foreman took each issue as answered as soon as any ten jurors agreed to it, and
that the negative votes came from different jurors on different issues. Since
the jury was instructed that the foreman should sign the verdict only if it was
reached by unanimous agreement, and the verdict was signed solely by the
foreman and returned as a unanimous verdict, the court concluded that "[a]
subsequent showing that the verdict was less than unanimous at some point
during the deliberations would not impeach the verdict as signed, returned
to and received by the court.' 143 It should be noted that none of the jurors
objected or spoke out when the trial court inquired whether the answers were
their verdict.
The forgetful juror will be glad to know that the taking of notes during
a trial has been approved by one appellate court. 144 Indeed, the court conin the jury trial of an accounting
cluded that the practice might be desirable
14 5
litigation.
complicated
other
or
suit
A comment by plaintiff's counsel during voir dire examination that in the
county of suit " 'probably 60 percent of the people would feel they could not
be fair to insurance companies, because they [insurance companies] have not
properly paid their claims'" was found to be improper by the court of civil
appeals in Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. King.'1 4 The remark did not,
however, constitute reversible error because its effect was nullified by the trial
court's instruction to the jury panel to disregard it.
139. See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1973).
140. Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. 1974).
141. 506 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1974).
142. TEX. R. Civ. P. 292. See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a.
143. 506 S.W.2d at 856.
144. Manges v. Willoughby, 505 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
145. Id. at 383.
146. 510 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court of Texas rendered a sharply divided opinion in Plain
Growers, Inc. v. Jordan1 47 and opened a Pandora's box of procedural ills.
During a monthly call of its docket, the trial court, on request of the plaintiff's
counsel, set the case for trial within an hour. The defendant's counsel, who
resided in another county, was not notified of the trial setting. The case was
called for trial at the time set, evidence was presented, and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The postcard notice of the judgment required
by rule 306d 148 was mailed by the clerk on the tenth day after entry of the
judgment and received by defendant's counsel the following day. On the sixteenth day, the defendant filed a motion for new trial contending that the
judgment, entered without notice of the trial setting and without allowing an
adequate opportunity to prepare for trial, was void. Under rule 330(b), 49
"by agreement of the parties, or on motion of either party, or on the court's
own motion with notice to the parties, the court may set any case for trial
at any time so as to allow the parties reasonable time for preparation." On
the basis of the comma following the words "either party," a majority of the
court concluded that rule 330(b) requires notice to the parties only when
a case is set by the trial court on its own motion. Consequently, since the
judgment was not void, the majority of the court concluded that it could not
be collaterally attacked. Refusing to allow their interpretation of rule
330(b) to turn on its punctuation, the dissent forcefully reasoned that the
phrase "with notice to the parties" required notice irrespective of whether the
early setting was on motion of one party or on the court's own motion.' 50
Petro-Chemical Transport, Inc. v. Carroll'5 ' centered on the failure of a
clerk of a trial court to comply with rule 306d'5 2 which provides that
"[i]mmediately upon the signing of any final judgment or other applicable
order, the clerk of the court shall mail a postcard notice thereof to each party
to the suit." After a trial on the merits, the trial judge notified counsel for
both parties that he was granting the plaintiff's motion for judgment. Counsel for plaintiff sent the judge a form of judgment for entry, and shortly thereafter it was entered. Counsel for defendant, however, did not receive a postcard notice from the clerk or otherwise learn of 'the entry of judgment until
after the times for filing a motion for new trial and perfecting an appeal had
expired. Seeking a reinstatement of its right of appeal, the defendant commenced a bill of review based primarily on the omission of the clerk. In
a case of first impression, the supreme court concluded that a bill of review
may be predicated on the clerk's failure to send the notice required by rule
306d. The court was careful to note, however, that the party seeking this
type of relief must also show a meritorious ground of appeal, and demon147. 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 40 (Nov. 2, 1974) (5-4 decision), afI'd on rehearing, 18
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 137 (Dec. 21, 1974).
148. TEx. R. Civ. P. 306d.
149. TEX. R. Civ. P. 330(b).

150. 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 41.
151. 514 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1974).
152. TEx. R. Civ. P. 306d.
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strate that his failure to file a motion for new trial or perfect an appeal was
not due to any negligence on his part.
The recitals in the judgment entered in Roberson Farm Equipment Co.
v. Hill'" reflected that the plaintiff was being allowed to recover a "gross
lost profit" from the loss of his cotton crop as well as the "expenses of producing" it. Conceding that the recitals pointed to a double recovery of damages, the court nevertheless held that the recitals were not competent to impeach the decretal portion of the judgment.
X1.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Section 5 of Rule 329b', 4 stipulates that "[j]udgments shall become final
after the expiration of thirty (30) days after the date of rendition of judgment or order overruling an original or amended motion for new trial."
Giving rule 329b a liberal interpretation, the court in Thompson v. Gibbs 5 "
held that a trial court also has jurisdiction to grant a new trial within thirty
days after a party's motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law.
XII.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

Ross v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,' 56 a recent decision
of the Dallas court of civil appeals, reiterates the rule that when a plaintiff
in a declaratory judgment action is seeking a declaration of nonliability, the
court should ignore the formal position of the parties and place the burden
of proof upon the party asserting the affirmative of the controlling issues.
XIII.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 377157 requires that the statement of facts be approved by the trial
court or agreed to by the parties prior to being filed on appeal. Showing
a preference for form over substance, the Texarkana court of civil appeals
recently refused to consider an appeal based on an unauthenticated statement
of facts even though the appellee failed to advance any reason why it was
8
unacceptable.'1
Morriss v. Pickett' 59 sets -forth the rule governing an appellate court's consideration of cross-points asserted by an appellee who has not taken an independent appeal. Relying on rule 420,60 the court held that under such circumstances cross-points could be considered "so long as they affect the interests of appellant or bear on matters presented on appeal."'"'
153. 514 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b(5).

155. 504 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ).

156. 507 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
157. TEx. R. Civ. P. 377.
158. Roberson Farm Equip. Co. v. Hill, 514 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. 503 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. TEx. R. Civ. P. 420.
161. 503 S.W.2d at 350.
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Rule 353162 provides that "[a]n appeal, when allowed by law, may be
taken by notice of appeal (1) in open court, noted on the docket or embodied
in the judgment, order overruling motion for new trial, or other minute of
the court, or (2) filed with the clerk." Interpreting the rule strictly, the court
in Grivel v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.1 68 concluded that an oral notice
of appeal, which was not evidenced by a writing, was ineffective.
XIV.

PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES

Guided by the procedural due process ruling in Fuentes v. Shevin,' 64 as
tempered by the recent decision in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,' 65 a federal

district court has declared the Texas sequestration statute' 6 6 unconstitutional.' 67 Finding that "[tihe Texas sequestration statute fails to comply
with prior notice and hearing requirements of Fuentes and does not measure
up to the standards approved by the Supreme Court in Mitchell," the district
court concluded that "Article 6840 and Rules 696-716 do not meet constitutional muster, in that they fail to provide due process of law as required by
68
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."'
Similarly, a Houston court of civil appeals, also relying on Fuentes, struck
down the Texas statute permitting prejudgment garnishment' 6 9 as being violative of the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.' 76
XV.

MISCELLANEOUS

Rule 267171 provides that "[a]t the request of either party, in a civil case,
the witnesses on both sides may be sworn and removed out of the court room
to some place where they cannot hear the testimony as delivered by any other
witness in the cause." Focusing on this, the Fort Worth court of civil appeals
recently reiterated the principle that "expert witnesses are exempt from the
operation of the Rule.'1 7 2 Consequently, "a violation of the Rule by an ex78
pert witness will not justify excluding his testimony.'
Article 2226,1 4 which authorizes the recovery of a reasonable attorney's
fee in specified cases, has been held to be inapplicable when a plaintiff recovers damages less than that recovered by a defendant on his counter162. TEX.R. Civ. P. 353.
163. 513 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
164. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
165. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).

166. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960).
716.

See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 696-

167. Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
168. id. at 1259.
169. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4084 (1966). See also id. art. 4076; TEX. R.

Civ. P. 657-79.
170. Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
171. TEX. R. Civ. P. 267.
172. Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. E.W. Moran Drilling Co., 509 S.W.2d 678, 685 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. Id. at 685.
174. TEX.REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1974).
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claim. 175 Additionally, "services rendered," as that term is used in article
2226, has been construed by one court to include the furnishing of electrical
energy.176

175. L.Q. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Boysen, 503 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
176. Caston v. Texas Power & Light Co., 501 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ).

